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I. Introduction 
 
 
Economic relations between the Republic of Korea (henceforth 
Korea) and the People’s Republic of China (henceforth China) have 
been expanding ever since China undertook the Four Modernization 
reforms in the late 1970s. Ever since then, bilateral trade between the 
two countries has been growing steadily in terms of both the volume 
and the variety of goods traded. Capital flows between the two likewise 
have been increasing although the flows have been mostly from Korea 
to China and in the form of direct investment.  Between 1989 and 2000, 
for instance, Korea’s merchandise exports to China grew from $213 
million to $18.4 billion while China’s merchandise exports to Korea 
grew from $3.9 million to $11.3 billion (ICSEAD 2002).  In fact, China 
has now emerged as Korea’s third largest trading partner. Also, by the 
end of 1999 Korea had invested $4.3 billion in China where it had 
virtually no investment before the late 1970s, and in the year of 2000 
alone Korea invested $307 million in China (China Statistical Press 1999, 
and Lee 2001). These increases in both trade and investment are signs of 
growing economic interdependence and integration of the two 
economies, which, we expect, will further economic growth in both 
countries.1 
China and Korea are two key players in Northeast Asia, a region 
that stretches from Japan on its eastern edge to the Mongolian People’s 
Republic in the west and the Russian Federation’s Far Eastern provinces 
in the north. It is one of the most dynamic regions in the world 
although it has yet to develop into a well-integrated economic entity 
with formal regional machinery similar to the European Union and the 
NAFTA.  
The European experience has clearly demonstrated that the 
establishment of formal regional institutions such as a free trade area 
and supranational or intergovernmental institutions can pave the way 
toward greater regional economic integration. Such institutions are, 
however, unlikely to emerge unless the region develops its own 
identity through economic interdependence and creates political 
support for them (Seliger 2002).  Trade and investment are what brings 
national economies together into close economic interdependence and 
will thus contribute to the process of regional economic integration.2 
                                                          
1 There are disputes regarding the effect of membership in economic union on the member 
countries’ long-term economic growth, but a recent empirical study points out that membership in 
European Union has had a positive effect on the long-term growth of the member countries 
(Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2002).  
2 Economic integration is usually defined as “a state of affairs or a process involving attempts 
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In this paper we investigate Korea’s direct investment in China and 
its implications for economic integration in Northeast Asia by 
investigating its effect on bilateral trade between Korea and China and 
other possible effects on economic integration. These two countries are 
key players in Northeast Asia and increasing interdependence between 
the two through trade and investment will significantly contribute to 
region-wide economic integration, as their increasing interdependence 
will lead to a greater division of labor, greater scale economies, and a 
higher rate of growth in their economies and thus create further 
incentives for other countries to join in.  
In the following section we lay out various possible linkages 
between outward direct investment (ODI) and bilateral trade between 
home and host countries. In section II we discuss the motives for 
Korea’s ODI in China with the purpose of shedding light on the 
investment-trade linkages between the two economies, and in section 
III we investigate the geographical distribution of Korea’s ODI within 
China and its determinants. We offer some concluding remarks in 
Section IV. 
 
 
II. Overseas Direct Investment, Trade, and 
Economic Integration 
 
 
ODI makes a direct contribution to economic integration of home 
and host economies by leading to the establishment of an affiliate or a 
subsidiary in a foreign country and thus transforming a national 
enterprise into a transnational one. Within this enterprise, as within any 
internal organizations, there is a hierarchical relationship between 
home office and affiliates and an up-and-down flow of information and 
personnel. Such exchange between home office and affiliates is not 
readily quantifiable as it bypasses the market, but being an intra-firm 
relationship it is a closer and more intimate person-to-person 
relationship than the typical arm’s-length relationship between 
independent agents across the market and thus has a greater integrative 
effect on the two economies.   
What effect ODI has on the trade relationship between home and 
host economies is less clear as it can either increase or decrease bilateral 
                                                                                                                             
to combine separate national economies into larger economic regions” and takes place through the 
establishment of formal regional machinery such as a free trade area, a customs union, a common 
market, or a complete economic union (Bende-Nabende 2002, p.11). In this paper we take it also to 
mean increasing economic connectedness between national economies through trade, investment, 
and labor movement. Thus economic integration can be brought about either through deliberate 
attempts to create formal regional machinery or by policy changes toward freer trade and 
investment or technological changes that facilitate trade/investment expansion between national 
economies.    
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trade or may even have no effect at all. It will have no effect on bilateral 
trade if it simply creates in the host country an “export platform” for 
third-country markets and replaces the home-country exports to those 
markets with the exports from the affiliate.  This kind of ODI is most 
likely to occur when a firm is seeking to minimize the labor cost by 
relocating its production site from home to a low labor-cost country.  
Even in that case, however, ODI will have a positive effect on bilateral 
trade if the affiliate imports intermediate goods from the home country.  
ODI will have a positive effect on bilateral trade if it leads to 
“reverse importing”— the home country importing the affiliate’s 
output and replacing what has been produced for home market with 
the goods from the affiliate. This will happen when the home country is 
losing its comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries and 
transfers them through ODI to another country that has a latent 
comparative advantage in the same industries. In this case, seeking to 
minimize the labor cost is obviously the main motive for ODI. This kind 
of ODI took place in Japan in the 1970s (Kojima 1996, Lee 1994) and also 
in Korea since the mid-1980s, as will be shown below.   
ODI will also have a positive effect on bilateral trade if it is for 
exploiting natural resources that the home country lacks. Its imports of 
natural resources from the host country may displace its imports of the 
same from a third country, but this “trade diversion” is likely to be 
welfare-improving for both countries since for the home country it is 
from a more costly to a less costly supplier of natural resources and for 
the host country it expands the market for its natural resources.  
ODI will have a negative effect on bilateral trade if it leads to a 
partial or full displacement of home country’s exports to the host 
country with locally produced goods.  This will occur if the motive for 
ODI is to serve the host-country market regardless of whether it is to 
jump a tariff wall or to reduce the cost of serving the market such as the 
cost of transportation. But even in this case ODI will not completely 
displace bilateral trade if the affiliates import intermediate products 
from their parent companies or home-country suppliers, which appears 
to generally happen.  
It is clear from the above discussion on the relationship between 
ODI and bilateral trade that we can infer the effect of ODI on bilateral 
trade from its motive. If the motive for ODI is to take advantage of low-
cost labor in the host country or exploit its natural resources it is likely 
to have a positive effect on bilateral trade whereas if the motive is to 
exploit the host-country market it is likely to have a negative effect 
(although negligible or even positive if intermediate inputs are supplied 
from home country). 
The discussion so far of the effect of ODI on bilateral trade is based 
on the assumption that in the economic relationship between two 
countries trade precedes ODI. It is quite possible, however, as 
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happened in China after the Four Modernizations that foreign 
investment comes in first to manufacture products in the host country, 
which then are exported. Such investment will have a positive effect on 
bilateral trade as it generally leads to importing intermediate products 
from the home country and possibly to exporting final products to the 
home country.    
 These investment-trade linkages are a direct effect of ODI on 
bilateral trade between home and host countries and do not take into 
account any indirect effect that ODI may have on bilateral trade 
through its effect on economic growth. As is well documented in the 
literature (e.g., Bende-Nabende 2002, Graham and Wada 2001, Henley, 
Kirkpatrick, and Wilde 2002, OECD 2000, Tseng and Zebregs 2002), 
ODI generally has a positive effect on the economic growth of the host 
country, and definitely in the case of China, as it brings in capital, 
advanced technology, and managerial know-how and expands 
employment while increasing competitive pressure on local enterprises 
and thus enhancing their efficiency. It is also likely to have a long-run 
positive effect on the home-country economy by transferring abroad the 
industries in which it is losing its comparative advantage and thus 
facilitating structural adjustment in accordance with changing 
comparative advantage. These changes in both home and host countries 
will have a positive effect on bilateral trade, provided that it is 
positively related to economic growth.   
If this indirect positive effect of ODI is taken into account, ODI 
motivated by low-cost labor will have a positive effect on bilateral trade 
whereas the effect of ODI motivated by host-country market will 
remain ambiguous, its sign depending on the relative magnitude of 
direct and indirect effects.3  
In addition to the ODI-trade linkages there is another reason why 
ODI will have a positive effect on regional economic integration, and 
that is the backward linkages created by ODI in the host country.  To 
the extent that the affiliates purchase locally produced intermediate 
goods the local suppliers participate in the production network that 
runs across national boundaries and become indirectly linked with the 
affiliates’ parent companies. This inclusion into parent companies’ 
production network will have as strong an effect on regional economic 
integration as bilateral trade, as demonstrated in the case of Southeast 
Asia and the coastal areas of China where foreign direct investment has 
been instrumental in promoting economic growth. As will be shown 
below, Korea’s ODI in China has led to extensive local procurement and 
thus to the inclusion of local Chinese firms into Korean firms’ 
production networks.    
                                                          
3 If ODI is tariff-hopping and goes into an import-substitute sector it may have a negative 
effect on economic growth and thus a negative indirect effect on bilateral trade.  
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III. Motives for Korea’s ODI in China and  
Its Effect on Bilateral Trade  
 
 
In investigating the effect of Korea’s ODI in China on the two 
countries’ bilateral trade we rely on the results of two recent surveys on 
Korea’s ODI, one carried out by the Korea Institute for Industrial 
Economics and Trade (KIET) and the other by the Korean Export-
Import Bank (KEXIM).  The KIET survey, conducted by two KIET 
researchers, Ha and Hong (1998), was based on a sample of 615 Korean 
companies (216 large firms and 399 small and medium-sized 
enterprises) and their 952 offshore affiliates. It contains information on 
the motives for overseas investment, the patterns of sales and 
procurement, and other activities of offshore affiliates, as reported by 
their parent companies registered officially as overseas investors in 1996. 
The KEXIM survey was based on a smaller sample of 290 large 
offshore affiliates with an outstanding investment of at least US$10 
million at the end of 1998.  Of these affiliates, 191 (66 percent) were the 
affiliates of the top 5 chaebols and 29 (10 percent) the affiliates of the next 
25 largest chaebols. Given that small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are not included in the KEXIM survey, we hope to draw some 
inference about ODI by Korea’s SMEs and its effect on economic integration 
by comparing the results of this survey with those of the KIET survey.  
 
 
1. Motives for Investing in China  
 
Table 1 reports the results of the KIET survey on the motives for 
Korea’s ODI in general. The survey asked the firms to pick the two 
most important from a number of motives for investing overseas— 
natural resource or raw materials, low-cost labor, market access, high 
technology, and “others.” Out of 305 firms with investment in China, 
179 firms (58.7 percent) reported low-cost labor and 66 firms (21.6 percent) 
market access as the most important motive for investing in China. These 
motives are quite different from those for investing in North America and 
Europe, which, according to the survey, are market access, “others” and 
high technology in a descending order of importance (Table 1).4 
Table 2, based on the KEXIM survey on the motives for Korea’s  
ODI, shows that export expansion from Korea was chosen by 34.3  
                                                          
4 This difference in motives between ODI in China and that in North America and Europe may 
to a certain extent be due to the fact that China has SEZs and others do not. Some of the Korean 
ODI in China is likely to be in SEZs but with no access to China’s internal markets. Due to lack of 
data we are unable to verify this possibility.   
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<Table 1> KIET Survey on Motives for Korea’s ODI by Region (As of 1996) 
                                                                                                                                            (Unit: %) 
 Natural resource or Raw materials Low-cost labour  Market Access High technology Others
Total         
(number of sample) 
Asia  10.1 52.5 27.7 0.8 8.9 100 (651) 
   China  12.8 58.7 21.6 0.0 6.9 100  (305) 
North America   6.5   8.7 58.7 9.4 16.7 100  (138) 
Europe    3.2   4.8 73.0 7.9 11.1 100    (63) 
Latin America  29.5 23.0 34.4 0.0 13.1 100    (61) 
All regions 11.3 39.6 36.3 2.5 10.3 100  (938) 
Note: The figures are the shares of the firms indicating the most important motive for investing abroad in total number of surveyed firms. 
Source: Ha and Hong (1998). 
 
 
<Table 2> KEXIM Survey on Motives for Korea’s ODI by Region (As of 1998) 
(Unit: %) 
 Natural resource or Raw materials Low-cost labour 
Export 
Expansion High technology Others
Total            
(number of sample) 
Asia  12.4 11.7 37.2 0.7 37.9 100 (145) 
   China    1.5 16.4 34.3 0.0 47.7 100   (67) 
North America 29.8   1.8 42.1 0.0 26.4 100   (57) 
Europe  20.0   1.7 51.7 0.0 26.7 100   (60) 
Latin America  26.6   0.0 53.3 0.0 20.0 100   (15) 
All regions 19.3   6.6 41.7 0.3 32.1 100 (290) 
Note: The figures are the shares of the firms indicating the most important motive for investing abroad in total number of surveyed firms. 
Data Source: KEXIM. 
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percent of the respondents as the most important reason for investing in 
China whereas low-cost labor was chosen by only 16.4 percent. This is 
significantly less than the 58.7 percent of the respondents in the KIET 
survey that reported low-cost labor as the most important motive for 
investing in China.  Given that the KEXIM survey covers only the 
affiliates of large firms whereas the KIET survey covers the affiliates of 
large firms as well as SMEs, we take the difference in the reported 
percentage as an indication that the motives for investing in China 
differ between large firms and SMEs. That is, for large firms the access 
to markets in China is the most important reason for investing in China 
whereas for SMEs China’s low-cost labor is the most important one.5   
The two surveys also report the motives for ODI by industry, which 
are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. It is clear that, as to be expected, low-
cost labor was the most important motive for Korea’s ODI in labor-
intensive industries.6 According to the KIET survey (Table 3), for a 
majority of firms in the textiles and apparel and the footwear and 
leather industries, which are all labor-intensive, low-cost labor was the 
most important motive for investing overseas (72.8 percent and 66.7 
percent of the respondents, respectively).  According to the KEXIM 
survey (Table 4), which breaks down the responses by region/country 
as well, 46.2 percent of the respondents in the textiles and apparel 
industry and 100 percent of the respondents in the footwear and leather 
industry that had invested in Asia regard low-cost labor as the most 
important motive for ODI. The corresponding figures for China are 100 
percent for the two groups of industries.   
The textiles and apparel and the leather and footwear industries had 
been two of Korea’s major export industries until it began losing its 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries in the mid-1980s, 
owing in part to rapid wage increases. Korean firms in those industries 
had already established highly developed international marketing 
networks and thus could continue to utilize them in marketing the 
products of their affiliates in China and other low-cost labor countries.  
In the case of those two industries it is reasonable to conclude that the 
exports from the Korean affiliates in China were displacing the export 
of the same goods from Korea. Whether it has led to bilateral trade in 
intermediate goods and “reverse imports” will be addressed later in the 
paper. 
                                                          
5 According to Tseng and Zebregs (2002), the market size is more important as a determinant 
of European and U.S. FDI in China than for FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan. That is, the motive 
for investing in China by European and U.S. investors is similar to that of large Korean investors 
whereas the motive of Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors is similar to that of Korea’s SME 
investors. See also Graham and Wada (2001). 
6 This survey results are consistent with the result of an econometric study that shows that 
investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan tend to use China to manufacture goods for export to 
industrialized countries and also tend to be concentrated in labor-intensive industries that only 
require low-skill labor (Fung, Iizaka, and Parker 2002). 
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<Table 3> KIET Survey on Motives for Korea’s ODI in Manufacturing (As of 1996) 
                              (Unit: %) 
 
Natural resource or 
Raw materials 
Low-cost 
labour  
Market Access High technology Others 
Total         
(number of sample) 
Manufacturing   10.8 55.5 22.8 1.5   9.4  100 (618) 
  Food and Beverage 26.8 31.7 36.6 0.0   4.9 100  (41) 
  Textiles and Apparel   8.6 72.8 11.3 0.0   7.3  100  (151) 
  Footwear and Leather   2.6 66.7 15.4 0.0 15.3 100  (39) 
  Wood 31.0 48.3 20.7 0.0   0.0 100  (29) 
  Paper and Printing 14.3 57.1   7.1 0.0 21.4 100 (14) 
  Petroleum and Chemical 14.7 35.3 38.2 4.4  7.4 100 (68) 
  Non-metallic metals 11.5 73.1   0.0 0.0 15.4 100 (26) 
  Basic metals 14.7 41.2 41.2 0.0   2.9 100 (34) 
  Fabricated metals   0.0 55.6 38.9 5.6   0.0 100 (18) 
  Machine and equipment 14.8 44.4 18.5 11.1 11.1 100 (27) 
  Electrical Machinery   0.0 69.0 27.6 0.0   3.4 100 (29) 
  Electronics and telecomm 
equipment 
  5.4 49.5 21.5 2.2 21.4 100 (93) 
  Motors and Freight   6.9 41.3 44.8 0.0   7.0 100 (29) 
Note: The figures are the shares of the firms indicating the most important motive for investing abroad in total number of surveyed firms. 
Source: Ha and Hong (1998), pp.124-125. 
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<Table 4> KEXIM Survey on Motives for Korea’s ODI in Manufacturing by Industry and Region (As of 1998) 
 (Unit: %) 
. Natural resource or 
Raw materials 
Low-cost 
labour 
Export 
Expansion 
High 
technology Others 
Total(number of 
sample) 
Manufacturing  8.9  [0.0] 18.9  [26.2]  46.7  [50.0] 0.0  [0.0]  15.6  [9.5] 100  (90) [42] 
   Food and Beverage 33.3 [0.0]  0.0   [0.0] 16.7 [0.0] 0.0  [0.0]   50.0  [100] 100    (6)   [3] 
   Textiles and Apparel 15.4 [0.0] 46.2  [100] 15.4 [0.0] 0.0  [0.0] 15.4  [0.0] 100  (13)   [2] 
   Footwear and Leather  0.0 [0.0] 100   [100]  0.0 [0.0] 0.0  [0.0]   0.0  [0.0] 100    (3)   [2] 
   Petroleum and Chemicals 33.3 [0.0] 11.1  [25.0] 22.2 [50.0] 0.0  [0.0] 33.3  [25.0] 100    (9)   [4] 
   Basic Metals  0.0 [0.0] 0.0   [0.0] 75.0 [80.0] 0.0  [0.0]   0.0  [20.0] 100    (8)   [5] 
   Machine and Equipment  0.0 [0.0] 28.6  [33.3] 57.1 [66.7] 0.0  [0.0]   14.3  [0.0] 100    (7)   [6] 
   Electronics and Telecomm equipment  0.0 [0.0] 12.5  [18.8] 68.8 [62.5] 0.0  [0.0]    6.3  [18.8]  100   (32) [16] 
Asia 
[China] 
   Motors and Freight  0.0 [0.0] 16.7  [33.3] 16.7 [66.7] 0.0  [0.0]  33.3  [0.0] 100    (6)   [3] 
Manufacturing 9.1 0.0 63.6 0.0 18.2 100  (11) 
   Machine and Equipment 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 100    (2) 
United 
States 
   Electronics and Telecomm equipment  0.0 0.0 80.0 0.0 20.0 100    (5) 
Manufacturing 15.4 3.8 50.0 0.0 19.2 100  (26) 
   Electronics and Telecomm equipment 21.4 0.0 57.1 0.0 7.1 100  (14) Europe 
   Motors and Freight  0.0 14.3 57.1 0.0 14.3 100    (7) 
Manufacturing 14.3 0.0 50.0 0.0 7.1 100  (14) 
   Textiles and Apparel 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 100    (2) 
   Basic metals 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100    (2) 
Latin 
America 
and Africa 
   Electronics and Telecomm equipment 12.5 0.0 62.5 0.0 0.0 100    (8) 
All region Manufacturing 10.6 12.8 48.9 0.0 15.6 100 (141) 
Note: 1) The figures are the shares of the firms indicating the most important motive for investing abroad in total number of surveyed firms. 
             2) The figures in [   ] are the share of the firms indicating the most important motive for investing in China in total number of surveyed firms.   
Data Source: KEXIM.  
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Tables 3 and 4 also show that low-cost labor in the host country was 
an important factor in the decision to invest overseas for firms in 
capital-intensive heavy industries such as machinery and equipment, 
electronics and telecommunications equipment, and motors and freight. 
This is particularly evident in the case of Korea’s ODI in China (Table 4).  
This apparent contradiction with the theory of comparative advantage 
(i.e., investment in capital-intensive industries in labor-abundant China) 
can be easily explained, however, once we recognize the increasingly 
widespread practice of intra-firm inter-process production 
arrangements or “international fragmentation” in production process 
(Jones 2001).7   
Production processes in heavy industries involve, relative to light 
manufacturing industries, a large number of separable sub-processes 
with different requirements for technology and factor intensity — some 
sub-processes requiring high-tech materials and component parts and 
others requiring an intensive use of low-cost labor. A firm in such an 
industry can minimize the unit cost of producing the final output by 
locating some processes in countries well endowed in physical and 
human capital and others in countries where low-cost labor is in 
abundant supply. For example, it may produce high-tech components 
in the home country where there is a high technological capability 
while the assembling of components is done in China where there is an 
ample supply of low-cost labor. Indeed, many Korean firms in heavy 
industries have made such production arrangements since the late 1980s 
by establishing assembly plants in China. International fragmentation thus 
makes it possible for a developing country to become a site for 
producing some parts of a previously wholly integrated process and to 
acquire new skills and knowledge by producing them. 
The Korean affiliates in heavy industries in China may be serving as 
an export platform for their parent companies. Even though in that case 
the affiliates’ exports from China are displacing exports from Korea, the 
international fragmentation of production processes has a positive 
effect on bilateral trade if parts and components are shipped from 
parent to affiliate firms. 
 
 
2. Trade Patterns of Korean Affiliates in China 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, we are able to make some 
informed guesses about the effect on bilateral trade of Korea’s ODI in 
                                                          
7 Jones (2001) defines international fragmentation in the production process as a phenomenon 
that allows previously integrated production processes at one location to be separated into various 
component parts, some of them being “outsourced” to other countries. He adds that international 
fragmentation does not necessarily occur within a multinational corporation and can take place as 
arm’s-length transactions whereby the market is utilized between firms.  
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China from the knowledge of its motives. In this section we try to find 
additional information on the ODI-trade nexus by looking into the 
procurement and sales patterns of affiliates as reported in the KIET and 
KEXIM surveys. This examination will provide us, however, only with 
a first approximation of the ODI-trade nexus since it does not take into 
account the indirect linkage effect of ODI that may take place in other 
sectors in the economy. 
 
2-a. Procurement and Import Patterns  
 
Table 5 reports the sources of procurement made by Korean offshore 
affiliates, as reported in the two surveys. According to the KIET survey 
(the top panel of the table), 60.5 percent of the total procurement of 
intermediate goods and materials by Korean affiliates in China came 
from Korea, 31.3 percent from local suppliers, and 8.2 percent from 
third countries. It is interesting to note that Korean affiliates outside of 
Asia (including China) imported a larger share of their intermediate 
goods and materials from Korea and procured less from local suppliers 
(with the exception of the affiliates in North America) in comparison 
with their counterparts in Asia. 
According to the KEIXM survey (the bottom panel of Table 5), the 
procurement pattern of large-firm affiliates differs from that of all 
affiliates: The former imported 44.7 percent of intermediate goods and 
materials from Korea (78 percent of this share came directly from their 
parent companies or related affiliates). Local suppliers in China 
accounted for 39.2 percent of total procurement while third countries 
accounted for 16.1 percent. In other words, Korea’s large-firm affiliates 
in China imported less from Korea, procured more locally and from 
third countries, implying that Korea’s SME-affiliates in China relied 
more heavily than their large-firm counterparts on imports from Korea 
and less from local and third-country sources. This difference may be 
due to the networks of SMEs being more localized in Korea than those 
of large firms, which we expect to be more global in reach.  Another 
reason might be that, relative to SMEs, large firms are concentrated in 
capital-intensive industries, which are internationally more fragmented 
in production processes than labor-intensive industries in which ODI 
from SMEs is concentrated.   
The results of the KEXIM survey are consistent with the information 
obtained from the KIET survey. That is, Korean affiliates in China 
imported a large share of their intermediate goods and materials from 
Korea, albeit not as much as that by those outside of Asia (including 
China). They generally procured more from local suppliers, creating 
substantial backward linkages within China. These results lead the 
conclusion that as far as procurement by affiliates is concerned Korea’s 
ODI in China has had a positive effect on bilateral trade and has 
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<Table 5> Sources of Procurement by Offshore Affiliates of Korean Firms by Region  
 (Unit: % of total procurement) 
KIET Survey (As of 1996) 
Import 
 Local Procurement 
Korea  Third Countries 
Total 
Asia 37.4 52.3 10.3 100 
   China 31.3 60.5   8.2 100 
North America 34.6 64.8   0.5 100 
Europe 19.6 80.1   0.3 100 
Latin America 12.6 85.9   1.5 100 
KEXIM Survey (As of 2000) 
Import 
 Local Procurement 
Korea  Third Countries 
Total 
Asia 45.4 (3.8) 33.4 (30.2) 21.3 (9.3) 100 
   China 39.2 (3.1) 44.7 (34.8) 16.1 (8.1) 100 
North America 20.1 (8.4) 58.7 (56.9) 21.2 (14.7) 100 
Europe 23.0 (7.9) 48.9 (45.4) 28.1 (14.4) 100 
Latin America 31.0 (14.8) 51.6 (46.4) 17.5 (8.6) 100 
Note: Figures in parenthesis of KEXIM survey are the share of the related affiliates out of total procurement. 
Source: Ha and Hong (1998), KEXIM. 
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created extensive backward linkages, thus contributing to the economic 
integration of the two countries.    
Table 6 shows the procurement pattern of offshore affiliates by 
manufacturing industry, as reported in the KIET survey.  For 
affiliates in food and beverages—natural-resource-based industries 
in which the motive for ODI is to obtain natural resources in the host 
country—the share of imports from Korea was, as to be expected, 
small, 7.2 and 0.9 percent, respectively. Their share of local 
procurement was quite large, 91.4 and 98.9 percent, respectively, 
indicating a strong backward linkage effect of ODI. 
In a number of labor-intensive industries and in some heavy 
industries the share of imports from Korea was very large. In the 
former group are the textile and the footwear and leather industries, 
where the share of inputs imported from Korea was 74.8 percent 
and 90.8 percent, respectively. In the latter group are the fabricated 
metals, electrical machinery, motors and freight, and electronics and 
telecommunication equipment industries, where the share was 96.0, 
74.5, 68.9 and 64.7 percent, respectively. For affiliates in those 
industries local procurement accounted for a small share of 
intermediate goods and materials, indicating that they are basically 
assemblers of imported parts utilizing low-cost labor in the host 
country. 
Table 7 reports the procurement pattern of Korea’s large-firm 
affiliates in China. In footwear and leather, basic metals, and 
machinery and equipment at least one half of intermediate goods 
and materials was imported from Korea. In food and beverage, 
apparel, non-metallic minerals, and motors and freight a significant 
portion of inputs was supplied locally, a sign of strong backward 
linkages of ODI in China by large-firm affiliates. In textiles and basic 
metals at least a third of inputs was imported from third countries.   
For manufacturing as a whole the share of inputs imported from 
Korea was 45.2 percent while the share of local procurement was 
38.5 percent. These high figures suggest that ODI in China by 
Korea’s large-firm affiliates has had a positive effect on economic 
integration of the two countries.8  
 
2-b. Sales and Export Patterns 
 
Table 8 reports the sales and exports of Korean affiliates as reported 
in the two surveys.  Korean affiliates in China exported 69.9 percent 
of their output to the rest of the world—27.9 percent to Korea and 42.0 
percent to third countries (the top panel of the table).  In comparison,  
                                                          
8 Doner (1997) argues that foreign affiliates in developing countries initially tend to rely 
heavily on their parent companies for intermediate goods but subsequently reduce their reliance 
on them as they develop supplier networks within the host country. 
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<Table 6> KIET Survey on Sources of Procurement by Offshore Affiliates of Korean Firms  
in Manufacturing by Industry (As of 1996) 
(Unit: % of total procurement) 
Import 
 Local Procurement
Korea  Third Countries 
Total 
Manufacturing 47.3 46.0 6.7 100 
  Food and Beverage 91.4   7.2 1.3 100 
  Textiles  21.8 74.8 3.4 100 
  Apparel 49.1 49.1 1.8 100 
  Footwear and Leather 7.0 90.8 2.2 100 
  Wood 32.8 51.5 15.7 100 
  Paper and Printing 62.0 32.6 5.4 100 
  Petroleum and Chemicals 30.9 33.0 36.1 100 
  Non-metallic metals 48.8 39.5 11.6 100 
  Basic metals 98.9 0.9 0.2 100 
  Fabricated metals 0.9 96.0 3.1 100 
  Machinery and equipment 68.1 27.4 4.5 100 
  Electrical Machinery 25.0 74.5 0.4 100 
  Electronics and telecomm equipment 16.7 64.7 18.6 100 
  Motors and Freight 31.1 68.9 0.0 100 
Source: Ha and Hong (1998), pp.66-67. 
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<Table 7> KEXIM Survey on Sources of Procurement by Korea’s Large-Firm Affiliates in China  
in Manufacturing by Industry (As of 2000) 
(Unit: % of total procurement) 
China 
Import 
 
Local Procurement 
Korea Third Countries 
Manufacturing   38.5 (3.1)  45.2 (35.1) 16.2 (8.1) 
   Food and Beverage   80.0 (0.0)  20.0  (0.0)    0.0 (0.0) 
   Textiles   29.5 (0.0)  32.2 (32.2)  38.3 (22.0) 
   Apparel   72.1 (0.0)  24.8 (24.8)    3.1 (0.0) 
   Footwear and Leather   29.9 (0.0)  68.5 (68.5)    1.5 (0.0) 
   Petroleum and Chemicals   44.2 (0.0) 27.9 (13.3) 27.8 (0.0) 
   Non-metallic Minerals 100.0 (0.0)   0.0  (0.0)   0.0 (0.0) 
   Basic Metals   17.0 (0.3)  49.8 (21.5)  33.1 (26.4) 
   Machinery and Equipment   10.0 (0.0)  67.4 (67.4) 22.6 (0.0) 
   Electronics and Telecommunication 
Equipment   41.8 (4.8)  45.1 (37.7) 13.1 (6.8) 
   Motors and Freight   55.6 (0.0)  44.4 (44.4)   0.0 (0.0) 
Note: 1) Figures in parenthesis are the share of related affiliates out of total procurement.  
Data Source: KEXIM. 
 
188  KDI 政策硏究 / 2003. II 
<Table 8> Sales Destination of Offshore Affiliates of Korean Firms by Region  
(Unit: % of total sales) 
KIET Survey (As of 1996) 
Export 
 Local Sales 
Korea  Third Countries 
Total 
Asia 64.5 14.2 21.3 100 
   China 30.2 27.9 42.0 100 
North America 93.9   3.6   2.5 100 
Europe 69.9   1.4 28.7 100 
Latin America 58.0 10.9 31.1 100 
KEXIM Survey (As of 2000) 
Export 
 Local Sales 
Korea  Third Countries 
Total 
Asia 49.1 (2.5) 30.0 (25.5) 20.9  (9.4) 100 
   China 46.7 (7.1) 24.5 (23.8) 28.8 (13.9) 100 
North America 83.5 (2.2)  5.5   (3.6) 11.0  (4.2) 100 
Europe 50.1 (6.2)  7.2   (4.4) 42.7 (9.8) 100 
Latin America 68.5 (13.2) 20.1 (20.1) 11.4 (4.2) 100 
Note: Figures in parenthesis of KEXIM survey are the share of the related affiliates out of total sales. 
Source: Ha and Hong (1998), KEXIM.  
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its large-firm affiliates exported 53.3 percent of their output to the rest 
of the world—24.5 percent to Korea and 28.8 percent to third countries 
(the bottom panel of the table), indicating that Korea’s SME affiliates in 
China exported a much larger share of their output. The share of local 
sales by the affiliates outside of China was much larger than that by the 
affiliates operating in China, suggesting that the latter performed 
largely as an export platform for Korean companies, especially for its 
SMEs.  
Table 9 shows that the Korean manufacturing affiliates as a whole 
sold 66.1 percent of their output in the host countries and exported 9.4 
percent to Korea and 24.5 percent to third countries.  It also shows a 
wide industry variation in the shares of local sales and exports. In food 
and beverage, petroleum and chemicals, non-metallic minerals, basic 
metals, fabricated metals, machinery and equipment, and motors and 
freight more than a half of the affiliate output was sold locally. In 
contrast, in textiles, apparel, footwear and leather, wood, paper and 
printing, electrical machinery, and electronics and telecommunication 
equipment more than a half of the output was exported. Reverse 
imports—exports back to Korea—accounted for 9.4 percent of the entire 
manufacturing sector output and was especially large in wood (41.9 
percent) and electrical machinery (44.4 percent). 
The large reverse imports in wood reflect a strategy of Korean firms 
for developing and importing resource-based products, which are in 
short supply in Korea. In contrast, the large share of reverse imports of 
electrical machinery in total sales reflects Korea’s changing comparative 
advantage and the displacement of home production with imports in 
some of the consumer durable goods markets in Korea.  
Table 10 reports the sales and exports of large-firm affiliates in China, 
as reported in the KEXIM survey. For the entire manufacturing sector, 
local sales in China accounted for 45.8 percent of total sales, reverse 
imports 24.9 percent, and exports to third countries 29.3 percent. 
Reverse imports were especially large in non-metallic minerals (89.1 
percent) followed by apparel (41.1 percent), textiles (38.3 percent), and 
electronics and telecommunication equipment (32.4 percent). As noted 
earlier (see Table 7), offshore affiliates in most of those industries 
procured much of their intermediate products from their parent 
companies; i.e., apparel 24.8 percent, textiles 32.2 percent, electronics 
and telecommunication equipment 45.1 percent. This pattern of 
procurement, combined with heavy reliance on reverse imports, 
suggests the importance of intra-firm trade for large-firm affiliates in 
those industries. 
For large-firm affiliates in China in the footwear and leather 
industry, third-country markets accounted for 79.5 percent of their total 
sales; for those in apparel 41.8 percent; and for those in electronics and 
telecommunication equipment 34.7 percent. 
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<Table 9> KIET Survey on Sales Destination of Offshore Affiliates of Korean Firms  
in Manufacturing by Industry(As of 1996) 
(Unit: % of total sales) 
Export 
 Local Sales 
Korea  Third Countries 
Total 
Manufacturing 66.1 9.4 24.5 100 
   Food and Beverage 77.2 10.2 12.6 100 
   Textiles  31.7 21.0 47.3 100 
   Apparel 24.5 19.8 55.7 100 
   Footwear and Leather 26.7 21.6 51.7 100 
   Wood 41.8 41.9 16.3 100 
   Paper and Printing 2.9 23.4 73.7 100 
   Petroleum and Chemicals 64.3 13.5 22.1 100 
   Non-metallic metals 67.3 20.5 12.2 100 
   Basic metals 95.4 2.3 2.3 100 
   Fabricated metals 56.8 3.8 39.5 100 
   Machinery and equipment 97.5 2.4 0.1 100 
   Electrical Machinery 19.4 44.4 36.1 100 
   Electronics and telecommunication equipment 27.4 7.6 65.1 100 
   Motors and Freight 86.7 0.9 12.3 100 
Source: Ha and Hong (1998), pp.56-57. 
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<Table 10> KEXIM Survey on Sales Destination of Korea’s Large-Firm Affiliates in China in  
Manufacturing by Industry (As of 2000) 
(Unit: % of total procurement) 
China 
Export 
 
Local Sales 
Korea Third Countries 
Manufacturing  45.8 (7.2) 24.9 (24.2) 29.3 (14.1) 
   Food and Beverage  76.2 (0.0)   0.0 (0.0) 23.8 (0.0) 
   Textiles  36.0 (6.1) 38.3 (38.3) 25.7 (0.0) 
   Apparel  17.0 (0.0) 41.1 (41.1) 41.8 (0.0) 
   Footwear and Leather    0.2 (0.0) 20.3 (20.3) 79.5 (0.0) 
   Petroleum and Chemicals   75.1 (12.9) 11.4 (11.4) 13.6 (11.5) 
   Non-metallic Minerals  10.9 (0.0) 89.1 (89.1)  0.0 (0.0) 
   Basic Metals   97.8 (18.9)  0.0 (0.0)  2.2 (0.2) 
   Machinery and Equipment  100.0 (12.2)  0.0 (0.0)  0.0 (0.0) 
   Electronics and Telecommunication Equipment   33.0 (5.1) 32.4 (31.2) 34.7 (21.2) 
   Motors and Freight   79.6 (0.0) 20.4 (20.4)  0.0 (0.0) 
Note: 1) Figures in parenthesis are the share of related affiliates of total sales. 
Data Source: KEXIM. 
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Reverse imports resulting from ODI clearly add to bilateral trade 
between home and host countries and reflect a changing comparative 
advantage between the two countries. 
What motivated Korean firms to invest in China was the rapidly 
increasing labor cost at home and an abundant supply of low-cost labor 
in China. An increasing gap in the labor cost between the two countries 
would have caused a contraction in labor-intensive industries in Korea 
and an expansion in the same in China even without the transplantation of 
those industries to China through ODI and would have led to Korea’s 
importing labor-intensive products from China. What ODI has done is to 
bring about a more rapid response of the international division of labor to 
changing comparative advantage and a greater expansion of bilateral trade 
between Korea and China than would have been otherwise (Ogawa 
and Lee 1996). 
 
 
IV. Sectoral and Geographical Distribution of 
Korea’s ODI in China and Its Determinants  
  
FDI in China is not evenly distributed throughout the country, being 
highly concentrated in the coastal areas (Broadman and Sun 1997, 
OECD 2000). Such geographical concentration implies that the effect of 
FDI on economic growth and integration into the world economy is not 
evenly distributed throughout China. If Korea’s ODI follows the same 
pattern its effect on bilateral economic integration will be also unevenly 
distributed, some areas in China being more integrated with Korea than 
others. In this section we investigate the geographical distribution of 
Korea’s ODI in China to find out the spatial distribution of its 
integrative effect in China.  
As is clear on Table 11, Korea’s ODI in China is, like FDI in China in 
general, concentrated in the coastal areas, which received 88.9 percent 
($2,896 million) of total FDI from Korea in 1993-97. The inland areas and 
the autonomous regions received only 9.3 percent and 1.8 percent, 
respectively, during the same period.  
Among the coastal areas the Shandong province is the most favored 
destination for Korean investment (28.5 percent of Korea’s ODI in 
China), followed by the Liaoning province (11.6 percent), the Jiangsu 
province (11.3 percent), the city of Shanghai (11.3 percent), the city of 
Tianjin (10.7 percent) and the city of Beijing (7.6 percent). It is 
noteworthy to point out that Korea’s ODI is concentrated, relative to 
FDI from the world, in Shandong, Liaoning, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Beijing—areas that are along the Yellow Sea and nearest to Korea.   
Another noteworthy point is that three provinces in China’s 
northeastern region (Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang) have received
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<Table 11> Geographical Distribution of FDI in China by Region (Cumulative, US$ Million)   
 
From Korea  (1993-1997) 
 
Total Large Firm SMEs 
From the World (1994-1997) 
Coastal areas 2,896.3 (88.9%) 1,777.0 (90.7%) 1,119.3 (86.2%) 135,609.7 (85.4%) 
Shandong 927.2 (28.5%) 434.4 (22.2%) 492.8 (38.0%) 10,650.5 (6.7%) 
Jiangsu 369.1 (11.3%) 293.7 (15.0%) 75.4 (5.8%) 19,599.2 (12.3%) 
Liaoning 377.0 (11.6%) 188.1 (9.6%) 188.9 (14.6%) 6,968.9 (4.4%) 
Tianjin 348.1 (10.7%) 209.1 (10.7%) 139.0 (10.7%) 7,200.0 (4.5%) 
Shanghai 367.4 (11.3%) 304.7 (15.6%) 62.7 (4.8%) 13,532.0 (8.5%) 
Beijing 248.7  (7.6%) 181.0 (9.2%) 67.7 (5.2%) 5,597.3 (3.5%) 
Guangdong 106.0  (3.3%) 71.9 (3.7%) 34.1 (2.6%) 44,112.6 (27.8%) 
Hebei 51.9  (1.6%) 26.2 (1.3%) 25.8 (2.0%) 3,003.4 (1.9%) 
Zhejiang 72.1  (2.2%) 55.8 (2.8%) 16.3 (1.3%) 5,432.3 (3.4%) 
Fujian 19.7  (0.6%) 5.6 (0.3%) 14.1 (1.1%) 16,038.7 (10.1%) 
 
Hainan 9.1  (0.3%) 6.5 (0.3%) 2.6 (0.2%) 3,474.8 (2.2%) 
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<Table 11> continued 
 
From Korea  (1993-1997)  
Total Large Firm SMEs 
From the World (1994-1997) 
Inland areas 301.8  (9.3%) 128.3 (6.5%) 173.5 (13.4%) 19,611.4 (12.4%) 
Jilin 125.8  (3.9%) 51.0 (2.6%) 74.8 (5.8%) 1,503.8 (0.9%) 
Heilongjiang 108.6  (3.3%) 24.7 (1.3%) 83.9 (6.5%) 2,166.2 (1.4%) 
Hunan 29.8  (0.9%) 28.6 (1.5%) 1.2 (0.1%) 2,501.2 (1.6%) 
Hubei 14.0  (0.4%) 12.3 (0.6%) 1.7 (0.1%) 2,756.4 (1.7%) 
Anhui 4.4  (0.1%) 2.0 (0.1%) 2.4 (0.2%) 1,793.6 (1.1%) 
Henan 3.0  (0.1%) 0.0 (0.0%) 3.0 (0.2%) 2,080.9 (1.3%) 
Shanxi 2.4  (0.1%) 0.3 (0.02%) 2.2 (0.2%) 502.5 (0.3%) 
Sichuan 7.4  (0.2%) 6.4 (0.3%) 1.1 (0.1%) 2,570.7 (1.6%) 
Shaanxi 3.9  (0.1%) 2.6 (0.1%) 1.3 (0.1%) 1,517.1 (1.0%) 
Jiangxi 0.9  (0.03%) 0.0 (0.0%) 0.9 (0.1%) 1,332.9 (0.8%) 
Guizhou 0.4  (0.01%) 0.4 (0.02%) 0.0 (0.0%) 201.8 (0.1%) 
Yunnan 1.1  (0.03%) 0.0 (0.0%) 1.1 (0.1%) 393.7 (0.2%) 
Gansu 0.0  (0.0%) 0.0 (0.0%) 0.0 (0.0%) 283.1 (0.2%) 
 
Qinghai 0.0  (0.0%) 0.0 (0.0%) 0.0 (0.0%) 7.5 (0.004%) 
Autonomous 
Regions 59.3  (1.8%) 54.0 (2.8%) 5.3 (0.4%) 3,516.1 (2.2%) 
Total 3,257.4 (100%) 1,959.3 (100%) 1,298.1 (100%) 158,737.2 (100%) 
Data Source: KEXIM, www.koreaexim.go.kr/oeis/index.hml, National Bureau of Statistics of China, www.stats.gov.cn 
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significant amounts of FDI from Korea, particularly from its SMEs, 
when the same provinces have received relatively negligible amounts 
from other countries. We explain this difference as due to the fact that 
those three provinces have the highest concentration of ethnic Koreans 
in China:9 The common language and some commonality in culture 
would have the effect of reducing the transactions cost in investing 
overseas, such cost reduction being more important for SMEs than 
large-firm affiliates.  
Table 12 reports the distribution of Korea’s ODI in China by 
province and by sector. In 1993-97 Korea’s ODI in manufacturing in 
China amounted to $2,649 million, about 81 percent of Korea’s total 
ODI in China. Within the manufacturing sector, electronics and 
telecommunication equipment registered the largest share (18.8 percent), 
followed by textiles and apparel (17.2 percent), machinery and 
equipment (10.4 percent), and petroleum and chemicals (9.4 percent).  
Investment by SMEs was concentrated in light industries such as textile 
and apparel, footwear and leather, and wood and furniture, whereas 
investment by large firms was concentrated in heavy and chemical 
industries such as electronics and telecommunication equipment, 
motors and freight, non-metallic minerals, and basic metals. 
The city of Tianjin was the largest recipient of Korean investment in 
electronics and telecommunication equipment whereas the provinces of 
Shandong, Liaoning and Jiangsu were the largest recipients of investment 
in textiles and apparel, machinery and equipment, and basic metal, 
respectively. 
In order to find out the factors that determine the geographical 
distribution of Korea’s ODI in China we carry out a regression analysis 
of the following location choice model of FDI that includes variables 
representing the level of economic development and foreign investment 
policies of different regions. The model is applied to two different sets 
of FDI data, one for large-firms and the other for SMEs.    
 
   ODIi  = β1  + β2 Yi  + β3Wi  + β4 Ei  + β5 Ii  + β6 DPi  + β7 DKi  + εi   
where   
ODIi = log of Korea’s net cumulative direct investment in 
a manufacturing industry in   
region i in 1993-97,    
Yi = log of nominal GDP of region i in 1995,   
Wi = log of nominal annual average wage for staff and  
workers in region i in 1995,    
Ei = ratio of the number of students enrolled in higher  
                 education to population in region i in 1995,  
                                                          
9 According to the 1990 China Census Data, ethnic Koreans in China numbered 1.92 million 
with 97 percent (1.86 million) residing in the three provinces in northeastern region (1.18 million in 
Jilin, 0.45 million in Heilongjiang, and 0.23 million in Liaoning).  
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<Table 12> Korea’s Net Outward Manufacturing Investment in China (Cumulative, 1993-97): 
By Sector and Region  
 (Unit: US$ thousand, %) 
 (1) FB (2) TA (3) FL (4) WF (5) PP (6) PC (7) NM (8) BM (9) FM (10) ME (11) ET (12) MF (13) OT Total 
Shandong 43,296 219,325 80,888 9,242 9,568 48,536 123,016 8,187 20,511 58,437 85,949 119,975 66,699 893,629 [33.7] 
Jiangsu 11,798   65,824 6,824 1,556 580 72,128 8,710 87,067 1,196 25,816 70,377 1,680 4,949 358,505 [13.5] 
Liaoning   9,281   39,926 27,692 14,290 11,076 16,089 28,907 17,818 9,143 73,104 26,710 19,478 11,391 304,905,[11.5] 
Tianjin   4,423   38,997 9,860 1,016 1,214 33,818 3,210 6,102 14,154 11,975 146,740 3,722 59,462 334,693 [12.6] 
Shanghai   8,366   17,846 1,214 2,151 21,678 1,608 6,487 300 5,795 8,171 42,506 14,610 8,695 139,427   [5.3] 
Beijing 22,709     7,259 2,204 309 680 14,116 18,059 1,190 5,013 18,443 39,092 4,743 5,273 139,090   [5.3] 
Guangdong   3,500     3,094 1,760 3,508 308 9,298 150 12,387 2,984 7,657 47,541 8,500 3,986 104,673   [4.0] 
Hebei 17,321     8,389 1,204 1,108 86 1,119 2,014 2,824 1,469 8,440 100 141 2,767   46,982   [1.8] 
Zhejiang   3,498     8,675 825 797 1,361 28,120 730 521 84 591 220 150 2,169   47,741   [1.8] 
Fujian 0     1,256 0 0 0 3,780 280 2,191 52 1,220 888 7,131 2,811   19,609   [0.7] 
Hainan 0 0 0 20 0 200 1,800 6,456 0 0 0 0 0     8,476   [0.3] 
Jilin 11,906   34,158 643 8,320 2,571 10,663 4,713 3,302 2,890 4,387 6,200 1,894 1,912   93,559   [3.5] 
Heilongjiang   6,257     4,725 951 3,090 1,773 2,880 1,167 2,031 898 54,873 1,840 1,048 -2,073   79,460   [3.0] 
Hunan 0       100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28,618 0 1,100   29,818   [1.1] 
Hubei     391    5,480 0 70 0 300 0 0 0 50 0 6,900 0   13,191   [0.5] 
Anhui 1,000 0 0 0 0 1,254 0 0 0 0 2,000 25 70     4,349   [0.2] 
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<Table 12> continued 
 (Unit: US$ thousand, %) 
 (1) FB (2) TA (3) FL (4) WF (5) PP (6) PC (7) NM (8) BM (9) FM (10) ME (11) ET (12) MF (13) OT Total 
Henan     906 0 0 0 0 902 64 0 0 526 80 0 50     2,528   [0.1] 
Shanxi  0 0 0 0 0 0 1,120 0 0 0 0 0 0      1,120 [0.04] 
Sichuan 0       781 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 156 0 0        937 [0.04] 
Shaanxi     315 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 200 0 211        738 [0.03] 
Jiangxi 0       146 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 139 0 0 0        307 [0.01] 
Guizhou  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 414 0        414 [0.02] 
Yunnan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [0.0] 
Gansu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [0.0] 
Qinghai 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [0.0] 
Total 145,636 
(5.5) 
456,191 
(17.2) 
134,065 
(5.1) 
45,477 
(1.7) 
50,942 
(1.9) 
249,050 
(9.4) 
201,837 
(7.6) 
150,376 
(5.7) 
64,189 
(2.4) 
276,076 
(10.4) 
499,217 
(18.8) 
205,926 
(7.8) 
169,544 
(6.4) 
2,648,526 [100] 
(100) 
          Large 80,282 
<55.1> 
185,955 
<40.8> 
29,850 
<22.3> 
7,973 
<17.5> 
22,893 
<44.9> 
131,212 
<52.7> 
149,353 
<74.0> 
125,341 
<83.4> 
14,393 
<22.4> 
136,074 
<49.3> 
376,661 
<75.5> 
149,078 
<72.4> 
57,510 
<33.9> 
1,466,575 
<55.4> 
          SMEs 65,354 
<44.9> 
270,236 
<59.2> 
104,215 
<77.7> 
37,504 
<82.5> 
28,049 
<55.1> 
117,838 
<47.3> 
52,484 
<26.0> 
25,035 
<16.6> 
49,796 
<77.6> 
140,002 
<50.3> 
122,556 
<24.5> 
56,848 
<27.6> 
112,034 
<66.1> 
1,181,951 
<44.6> 
Note: (1) Food and Beverage (FB), (2) Textiles and Apparel (TA), (3) Footwear and Leather (FL), (4) Wood and Furniture (WF), (5) Paper and Printing (PP), (6) Petroleum 
and Chemicals (PC), (7) Non-Metallic Minerals (NM), (8) Basic Metals (BM), (9) Fabricated Metals (FM),  (10) Machinery and Equipment (ME), (11) Electronics and 
Telecommunication Equipment (ET), (12) Motors and Freight (MF), (13) Others (OT) 
Data Source: KEXIM, www.koreaexim.go.kr/oeis/index.hml 
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Ii  = total length of road in region i per square kilometer 
of land in 1995,      
DPi = dummy variable for Special Economic Zones and 
Open Coastal Cities,  
DKi = dummy variable for provinces where ethnic Koreans 
constitute a major minority group,  
Ε =  stochastic disturbance term 
 
Y, GDP, represents the market size of a region and is expected to 
have a positive coefficient and the variable W, with a negative expected 
coefficient, is to capture low-cost labor as a motive for Korea’s ODI in 
China. The variable E is to capture the importance of the availability of 
skilled labor as a motive for ODI and is expected to have a positive 
coefficient. It is well recognized in the literature that the availability of 
infrastructure is an important factor in the decision on where to locate 
FDI and various indicators have been used as a measure of 
infrastructure availability. In our regression we use the total length of 
road within a region (I), normalized by its geographical size, as a 
measure of infrastructure availability.   
The regression model also includes a dummy variable for 
preferential policies for FDI inflows. As is well known, China has a 
number of open economic zones such as Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) and Open Coastal Cities (OCCs), which offer special tax 
incentives and maintain a liberal trade and investment regime but are 
separated from China’s internal markets. The policy dummy variable 
(DP) is assigned value 1 for Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan, Liaoning, 
Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, areas designated as either 
SEZ or OCC, and value 0 for other areas. The expected sign for DP is 
positive. Another dummy variable (DK) is included in the model to find 
out whether common culture/language mattered in locational 
decisions of Korean investors. It is assigned value 1 for the three 
provinces of Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning where ethnic Koreans 
constitute a major minority group and value 0 for other provinces.  
The dependent variable employed in the model is the net 
cumulative manufacturing investment for 1993-97. For estimation we 
apply the canonical censored regression model, given that the 
dependent variable is left censored at zero. All the data for the 
independent variables are for 1995, a midpoint in the 1993-97 period.10 
We have shown in the preceding sections that there is a significant 
difference in the motives for ODI as well as in the sales and 
procurement patterns between large firms and SMEs. Those differences 
imply that the large-firm affiliates would be much more sensitive to the 
                                                          
10 Data for the variables used in the regression analysis are from the following sources: ODI 
from KEXIM (www.koreaexim.go.kr/oeis/index.hml), variables Y, W, E, and I from National 
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) (www.stats.gov.cn).  
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size of local market and less sensitive to labor cost and would produce 
more of their output for local markets than SMEs. They also imply a 
larger regression coefficient of the local market size (Y) for large-firm 
affiliates than for SMEs and a smaller absolute value of the negative 
coefficient of labor cost (W) for large-firm affiliates than for SMEs.  
Two sets of regression results are reported on Table 13. The first set 
(Model I), which includes all the independent variables discussed above, 
shows that in the case of SMEs all the explanatory variables are 
statistically significant and have the correct signs whereas in the case of 
the large-firm affiliates only the market size (Y) and the policy dummy 
variable (DP) are significant and have the correct signs. Model I, 
however, suffers from multi-collinearity as the infrastructure variable 
(I) is highly correlated with wage (W) and education (E).11   
The second set of regression results (Model II), which excludes 
infrastructure as an independent variable, shows that the estimate of 
the market size (Y) is positive and statistically significant for both large-
firm affiliates and SMEs and is larger for the former than the latter, a 
result consistent with the survey results discussed in a preceding section.   
The estimate of the wage-rate coefficient is negative for both large 
firms and SMEs, as expected, but is statistically significant only in the 
case of SMEs. This result is consistent with the survey result that low-
cost labor is the most important motive for SMEs but not for large-firm 
affiliates. There is also a notable difference between large-firm affiliates 
and SMEs with respect to the effect of labor quality (E) on Korea’s ODI 
in China. The coefficient of this variable is much larger for large-firm 
affiliates than for SMEs. 
These results are consistent with the observation made earlier that 
investments in China by SMEs are concentrated in low-skilled labor-
intensive industries such as textiles and apparel, footwear and leather, 
and wood and furniture whereas investments by large firms are 
concentrated in capital- and technology-intensive industries such as 
electronics and telecommunication equipment, and motors and freight 
that require more skilled labor. For the first group of investments, low-
cost labor is a more important factor in determining where to locate 
than the quality of labor and conversely for the second.  
The dummy variable for preferential policies has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for both large-firm affiliates and 
                                                          
11                      <Correlation Matrix for the Explanatory Variables> 
 Y W E I DP DK 
Y 1.00      
W 0.14  1.00     
E 0.04  0.63  1.00    
I 0.34  0.73  0.70  1.00   
DP 0.35  0.33 -0.08  0.35  1.00  
DK 0.05 -0.30  0.06 -0.23 -0.02 1.00 
 
200  KDI 政策硏究 / 2003. II 
 
 
<Table 13> Locational Determinants of Korean Firms’ Manufacturing Investment in China (1993-97)  
 
Model I Model II 
 
Large firms SMEs Large firms SMEs 
GDP 1.94 * (1.9) 
1.88 *** 
(4.5) 
2.13 ** 
(2.0) 
2.08 *** 
(3.8) 
Wage -4.83 (-0.8) 
-7.03 *** 
(-2.73) 
-2.12 
(-0.4) 
-5.01 * 
(-1.9) 
Labour Quality 6.45 (1.6) 
4.02 ** 
(2.0) 
9.4 *** 
(2.9) 
6.89 *** 
(4.1) 
Infrastructure 11.62 (1.1) 
11.02 ** 
(2.5) - - 
Dummy: 
Government policy
5.70 *** 
(3.0) 
3.15 *** 
(3.6) 
6.6 *** 
(3.6) 
3.87 *** 
(4.2) 
Dummy: Korean 
People 
3.92 
(1.5) 
3.96 *** 
(3.3) 
3.02 
(1.2) 
2.67 ** 
(2.2) 
Constant 30.20 (0.6) 
52.76 ** 
(2.5) 
8.1 
(0.2) 
36.5 * 
(1.7) 
Adjusted  R2 0.55 0.77 0.56 0.73 
Note: 1) t-values are in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
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SMEs with the effect being stronger on investments from large-firms 
than those from SMEs.  Finally, the estimate of the coefficient of the 
dummy variable for common culture/language is positive and 
statistically significant for SMEs but not significant for large-firm 
affiliates, as expected.   
 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
No single motive drives a country’s ODI and Korea’s case is no 
exception: Some firms have invested in China to take advantage of its 
cheap labor and others have invested in China for market access or to 
secure its natural resources. In spite of such diverse motives the data 
presented in this paper suggest that Korea’s ODI in China as a whole 
has had a positive effect on the two countries’ bilateral trade. We also 
have found out that Korea’s ODI in China is not evenly distributed 
throughout China, being limited mostly to the coastal areas and the 
areas with a high concentration of ethnic Koreans.  
If by economic integration we mean that capital, labor, and goods 
and services can move between countries more freely than otherwise, 
Korea’s ODI in China certainly has had and will continue to have a 
positive effect on the economic integration of the two countries. It will 
further the integrative process by promoting information and personnel 
exchange between the two countries and by inducing them to abide by 
contracts and accept property rights and the rule of law and to realize 
the importance of cross-border harmonization of rules and regulations 
on trade and investment. These are the effects of ODI that are rarely 
quantified and seldom discussed in the literature but perhaps are more 
important for regional integration in the long run.  
Recently, at a meeting in Beijing a group of Korean business leaders 
proposed that China, Japan and Korea establish a joint policy 
coordination body with the aim of creating a Northeast Asian free trade 
area (Digital Korea Herald, Friday June 7, 2002).12  Creating such an area 
would be a difficult task in the short run because there are a number of 
economic, historical and political factors unique to the region that many 
argue hinder its immediate establishment (Lee, forthcoming; Schott and 
Goodrich 2001, Seliger 2002). Those factors should not be, however, a 
barrier to the establishment of a joint policy coordination body, which 
                                                          
12 A similar proposal for establishing a regional economic cooperation body, the Council for 
Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation, was made by Lee (2001) in August 2001.  His rationale for 
the proposal is that although establishing a free trade area of China, Japan, and Korea in the near 
future is unlikely a cooperation body can perform some useful functions such as strengthening the 
voice of the three countries in the international arena and pave the way to future formal economic 
integration in the region.  
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can carry out the task of promoting trade and investment among them 
and contributing to the creation of a strong regional identity. That way 
it will pave the way toward building formal regional machinery in 
Northeast Asia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Korea’s Direct Investment in China and Its Implications for Economic Integrati  in Northeast Asia   203 
 
 
References 
 
 
Bende-Nabende, Anthony, Globalisation, FDI, Regional Integration and Sustainable 
Development: Theory, Evidence and Policy, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
Aldershot, England, 2002. 
Broadman, Harry G. and Xiaolun Sun. “The Distribution of Foreign Direct 
Investment in China,” Policy Research Working Paper 1720, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C., February 1997. 
China Statistical Press, China Statistical Yearbook 1999 (Tables 17-15), 1999. 
Crespo-Cuaresma, Jesú’s et al., “Growth, Convergence and EU Membership,” 
Working Paper 62, Austrian Nationalbank, Vienna, 2002. 
Doner, Richard, “Japan in East Asia: Institutions and Regional Leadership,” in P. 
Kazenstein and T. Shiraishi (eds.), Network Power: Japan and Asia, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1997. 
Fung, K.C., Hitomi Iizaka, and Stephen Parker, “Determinants of U.S. and 
Japanese Direct Investment in China,” mimeo, University of California, 
Santa Cruz, March 2002. 
Graham, Edward M. and Erika Wada, “Foreign Direct Investment in China: 
Effects on Growth and Economic Performance,” in P. Drysdale (ed.), 
Achieving High Growth: Experience of Transitional Economies in East Asia, 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Ha, Byung-Ki and Seock-Il Hong, An Analysis of the Actual Management 
Conditions of Korean Investors Overseas, Korea Institute for Industrial 
Economics and Trade, Seoul, 1998. (in Korean) 
Henley, John, Colin Kirkpatrick, and Georgina Wilde, “Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in China: Recent Trends and Current Policy Issues,” 
1998. http://idpm.man.ac.uk 
ICSEAD, East Asian Economic Perspectives: Recent Trends and Prospects for Major 
Asian Economies, Vol. 13, Kitakyushu, Japan, February 2002. 
Jones, Ronald W., “Globalization and the Fragmentation of Production,” Seoul 
Journal of Economics, Vol.14, No.1, Spring 2001, pp.1-13. 
Kojima, Kiyoshi, “A Macroeconomic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment,” 
in K. Kojima, Trade, Investment and Pacific Economic Integration, Bunshindo, 
Tokyo, 1996. 
Korea Export-Import Bank (KEXIM), Analysis of Business Activities of Korea’s 
Overseas Affiliates, KEXIM, Seoul, March 2000. (in Korean) 
Lee, Chang-Jae, “Rationale for Institutionalizing Northeast Asian Economic 
Cooperation and Some Possible Options,” a paper presented at the 2001 
KIEP/NEAEF conference on “Strengthening Economic Cooperation in 
Northeast Asia,” Honolulu, Hawaii, 16-17 August 2001. 
Lee, Chung H., “Korea's Direct Foreign Investment in Southeast Asia,” ASEAN 
Economic Bulletin, Vol.10, No.3, March 1994. 
204  KDI 政策硏究 / 2003. II 
______, “Toward Economic Cooperation in East Asia,” in Lee-Jay Cho, Yoon 
Hyung Kim, and Chung H. Lee (eds.), A Vision for Economic Cooperation in 
East Asia, Korea Development Institute and East-West Center, 2003. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Main 
Determinants and Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment on China’s 
Economy,” Working Paper on International Investment, No.2000/4, Paris, 
December 2000. 
Ogawa, Kazuo and Chung H. Lee, “Changing Comparative Advantage and 
Direct Foreign Investment: The Case of Six Japanese Industries,” in 
Richard Hooley, Anwar Nasution, Mari Pangestu, and Jan Dutta (eds.), 
Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation: Theory and Practice, Vol. 7, part B, JAI 
Press, Greenwich, 1996, pp.279-296.  
Schott, Jeffrey J. and Ben Goodrich, “Reflections on Economic Integration in 
Northeast Asia,” a paper presented at the 2001 KIEP/NEAEF conference 
on “Strengthening Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” Honolulu, 
Hawaii, 16-17 August 2001. 
Seliger, Bernhard, “Korea’s Role in East Asian Regional Cooperation and 
Integration,” Korea’s Economy 2002, Vol.18, Korea Economic Institute, 
Washington, D.C., 2002. 
Tseng, Wanda and Harm Zebregs, “Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some 
Lessons for Other Countries,” IMF Policy Discussion Paper (PDP/02/3), 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., February 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Korea’s Direct Investment in China and Its Implications for Economic Integrati  in Northeast Asia   205 
 
<Appendix> Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables (1995) 
 
 GDP (billion yuan) Average Wage (yuan) Education (%) Infrastructure SEZs/OCCs 
 Beijing 139 8,144 1.46 0.69 - 
 Tianjin   92 6,501 0.72 0.38 OCC 
 Hebei 285 4,839 0.20 0.27 OCC 
 Shanxi 109 4,721 0.22 0.22 - 
 Liaoning 279 4,911 0.44 0.30 OCC 
 Jilin 113 4,430 0.39 0.17 - 
 Heilongjiang 201 4,145 0.31 0.11 - 
 Shanghai 246 9,279 1.02 0.60 - 
 Jiangsu 516 5,943 0.30 0.25 OCC 
 Zhejiang 352 6,619 0.21 0.33 OCC 
 Anhui 200 4,609 0.14 0.25 - 
 Fujian 216 5,857 0.22 0.38 SEZ, OCC 
 Jiangxi 121 4,211 0.20 0.21 - 
 Shandong 500 5,145 0.18 0.35 OCC 
 Henan 300 4,344 0.13 0.30 - 
 Hubei 239 4,685 0.32 0.26 - 
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<Appendix> continued  
 
 GDP (billion yuan) Average Wage (yuan) Education (%) Infrastructure SEZs/OCCs 
Hunan 220 4,797 0.20 0.28 - 
 Guangdong 538 8,250 0.22 0.48 SEZ, OCC 
 Hainan   36 5,340 0.17 0.44 SEZ 
 Sichuan 353 4,645 0.18 0.18 - 
 Guizhou   63 4,475 0.10 0.18 - 
 Yunnan 121 5,149 0.13 0.17 - 
 Shaanxi 100 4,396 0.37 0.19 - 
 Gansu   55 5,493 0.19 0.08 - 
 Qinghai   17 5,753 0.15 0.02 - 
 Average 217 5,467 0.33 0.28 NA 
Note:  1)  Education: ratio of the number of students enrolled in higher education to population in 1995. 
            2) Infrastructure: total length of road in 1995 per square kilometer of land. 
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, www.stats.gov.cn 
 
 
 
